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INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL
REFORM
THOMAS H. HILL*

Sustained economic development in the Latin American region seems
forever within reach, only to elude capture again and again in an apparently
endless cycle of success and failure. In the post-World War Two era alone,
countries as diverse as Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, and
Peru have undergone periods of profound optimism as their economies
have grown and their peoples prospered, only then to suffer startling and
sudden setbacks in the form of currency crises, political upheaval, corruption scandals and social instability.' For example, following the Peso crisis
of 1982 and a period of gradual democratization, solid economic growth,
and trade liberalization in the early 1990s, Mexico suffered a massive devaluation of its Peso currency in 1994.2 Given the substantial size of its
economy, its close economic ties to the United States and the enormous
exposure of American and international banks in Mexico, the crisis there
threatened to lead to a massive loss of confidence in emerging markets
worldwide. 3 Swift action by then-President Bill Clinton, as well as the In-

* Visiting Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. PATRICE FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 160-61 (3d
ed. 2007); D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into NonEnforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 236
nn.4-8 (2008); Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts and
Arguments 3-4 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper, Paper No. 06/210, 2006), available at
http://www.internationalmonetaryfund.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp
0621 0.pdf;
see
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2. James M. Cypher, Mexico: Financial Fragility or Structural Crises?, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 451,
451-53 (1996); Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origin ofMexico's 1994 Financial Crisis, 17 CATO J. 303, 303
(1998).
3. See generally Santiago Bazdresch & Alejandro M. Werner, Contagion of International Financial Crises: The Case of Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION 323-26 (Stijn Claessens
& Kristin J. Forbes eds., 2001), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/ managing%20volatility/contagion/book.html (scroll down to "Section IV: Case Studies of Contagion" and
select "Contagion of International Financial Crises: The Case of Mexico" hyperlink) (discussing the
contagion attendant on currency crises); Paolo Pesenti & Cedric Tille, The Economics of Currency
Crises and Contagion: An Introduction, ECON. POL'Y REV., Sept. 2000, at 3, 3, 8, available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/00v06n3/0009pese.pdf. For a general discussion of contagions
of financial crises in emerging markets grounded in economics theory, see Rodrigo Vales, Emerging
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ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and private banks, averted the crisis and
helped to restore the international credibility of emerging market debt. 4 To
its credit, Mexico went on to justify the international rescue effort and,
especially following the gradual but accelerating implementation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 5 in 1994, the Mexican
economy has shown impressive export growth, relative stability in its cur6
rency and sustained, if cyclical, economic growth.
A similar pattern can be seen in Argentina. When I worked at the
World Bank in the mid-1980s, Argentina was an economic problem child:
a massive lack of confidence in its currency, combined with exchange controls, high inflation and high unemployment, led to capital flight, a lack of
new foreign investment, and a threatened default of Argentina's international debt obligations. 7 The World Bank and the IMF, together with other
international lenders, put together a bailout package; the currency was stabilized (replaced by a new currency), and Argentina went on to a period of
sustained economic growth. Alas, it did not last. 8 In 2001, a new crisis of
confidence shook Argentina, leading to the restructuring (or seizures, depending on one's point of view) of private property rights referred to in
Horacio Spector's contribution to this Symposium. 9 Today, however, Argentina's economy is growing again at impressive rates.' 0
Markets Contagion: Evidence and Theory (Banco Central de Chile Working Paper, Paper No. 007,
1997), availableat http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/studies/working-papers/007.htm.
4. Bradford De Long, Christopher De Long & Sherman Robinson, The Case for Mexico's Rescue: The Peso Package Looks Even Better Now, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1996, at 8, 8, 12; Sebastian
Edwards & Miguel A. Savastano, The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994
Currency Crisis 26-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6516, 1998).
5. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2000).
6. See Econ. Comm'n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], Mexican Sub-Regional Headquarters, Mexico: Economic Growth Exports and Industrial PerformanceAfter NAFTA 15-19 CEPAL
Estudios y Perspectivas Serie No. 42 (Dec. 2005) (preparedby Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Juan Carlos
Valdivia & Jesfis Santamaria), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Mexico_ afterNAFTAECLAC.pdf.
7. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1-2 (2002) available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 8040.pdf; see

Ana Maria Cerro & Osvaldo Meloni, Crises & Crashes:Argentina 1885-2003, at 3 (EconWPA Econ.
History Series, Paper No. 0505001, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpeh/0505
001 .html.
8. See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SFRV., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 3-5
(2003), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21072-20030605.pdf; Timothy J. Kehoe, What
Can We Learnfrom the Current Crisis in Argentina? 1-2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research
Dep't Staff Report, No. 318, 2003), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/-tkehoe/papers/argentina
.pdf.
9. Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
129, 138-44 (2008).
10. ROBERTO FRENKEL & MARTiN RAPETTI, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH,
ARGENTINA'S MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES AFTER THE CONVERTIBILITY REGIME

2008]

INTRODUCTION

Similar tales of ups and downs, swings and gyrations, and dizzying
volatilities can be told of other Latin American countries.l I It is beyond the
purpose and scope of this brief Introduction to recount them in detail.
To be sure, there are success stories (beyond the recent successes enjoyed by Mexico and Argentina), though perhaps at a price. Chile, for example, has seen steady economic growth since the controversial and
damaging foreign investment nationalizations under Salvador Allende and
the subsequent coup that brought General Pinochet to power. 12 But, the
price was high in terms of political repression, incarceration of the opposition, torture, "disappearings" and killings, erosion of civil liberties, and the
systematic undermining of democratic institutions. It is only in approximately the last ten years that Chile has begun to come to terms with this
dark side of its economic success. 13 Still, the economy has been on firm
ground and democracy has more than gained a foothold: we can be cautiously optimistic that Chile is well on its way to becoming a mature, stable, democratic, and prosperous nation that provides a decent standard of
14
living and fair economic opportunities for most, if not all, its people.
Costa Rica is another success story, at least relatively speaking. Its
economy has not grown as rapidly as that of Chile,' 5 but, on the other hand,
it has not suffered the upheaval of unstable governments, coups, dictatorships, social dislocation, political swings, and repression that Chile and
other far less successful countries have experienced. 16

COLLAPSE 10-15 (2007), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina_2007
04.pdf.
11. For a comprehensive description of Latin American economic history, see sources cited supra
note I.
12. SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE: 1808-2002, at 370-76 (2d ed.
2004); JAVIER MARTINEZ & ALVARO DiAZ, CHILE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 1, 41-74 (1996);

Jose De Gregorio, Economic Growth in Chile: Evidence, Sources and Prospects 1-2 (Banco Central de
Chile, Working Paper No. 298, 2004), available at http://www.bcentral.cl/jdegrego/pdf/jdg30l2004b
.pdf.
13. See MARK ENSALACO, CHILE UNDER PINOCHET: RECOVERING THE TRUTH, at ix-xv, (2000);
Kirsten Sehnbruch, Prosecuting Pinochet (Apr. 25, 2005) (unpublished article), available at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu:700 1/Events/spring2005/04-25-05-guzman/index.html.
14. Eduardo Aninat, Chile in the 1990s: Embracing Development Opportunities,FIN. AND DEV.,
Mar. 2000, at 19, 19-20; Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Chile's Economic Growth, 43 CUADERNOS DE
ECONOMiA: LATIN AM. J. OF ECON. 5, 9, 18, 34-35 (2006).
15. ANDRES RODRiGUEZ-CLARE, MANRIQUE SAENZ & ALBERTO TREJOS, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
COSTA RICA: 1950-2000, at 31-34 (2002), available at http://www.econ.psu.edu/-aurI0/Papers/
EconomicGrowthCR.pdf.
16. Agustin Carstens, Deputy Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund, Address at the Academy
of Central America, Costa Rica, Seminar on Volatility and Vulnerability: Twenty Years Without a
Crisis in Costa Rica: The IMF's View (July 12, 2004), available at http://imf.org/extemal/
np/speeches/2004/071204.htm.
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The hard data, namely economic statistics and indicators, bear out this
largely impressionistic and anecdotal picture of Latin American countries.
For example, for the region as a whole, the World Bank measured economic growth at an average of approximately 1.8% for the period from
1980 to 1990; 3.5% for the period from 1990-2000; a negative 0.5% for the
period from 2000 to 2002; and 2% for 2003.17 This is well below the rates
measured for the same periods, respectively, for the East Asia and Pacific
region (at 8%, 8.1%, 6.6% and 8%), the South Asia region (at 6%, 6%, 5%
and 8%), and even somewhat below the growth rates for the Sub-Saharan
Africa region (at 2%, 2.5%, 3.5% and 4%).18 If one looks at a more differentiated picture by examining the economic performance of individual
countries in Latin America, it becomes clear that there have been substantial pockets of progress even during times when the region as a whole presents an uneven picture. Volatility remains an issue, however. Brazil, for
example, weighs in at an average growth rate of 7% during the so-called
"Miracle Years" of the 1970s, but then slipped into a period of decidedly
lackluster performance, if not outright stagnation, with growth rates of
0.5% in the 1980s and 0.4% in the 1990s. 19 Mexico, displaying a similarly
unhealthy volatility, had a 6.8% GDP growth rate for the period 1970-81,
followed by growth rates of 0.3% and 3.66% for the periods 1982-88 and
1988-2000, respectively. 20
This pattern of economic volatility is typical throughout Latin America. As a senior official of the IMF recently commented:
[A] striking fact of Latin America's economic history is the frequency
and regularity with which growth, once underway, has suffered setbacks.... [E]xpansions have often been short-lived, ending with crises
or prolonged periods of stagnation. Latin American business cycles have

17.

THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2005, at tbl.4a (2005), available at

http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section4.htm.
18. Id.
19.

JUAN S. BLYDE & EDUARDO FERNANDEZ-ARIAS,

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE SOUTHERN

CONE 18 fig.1 (2004), available at http://www.iadb.org/regions/rel/econ/REI-04-004.pdf. For a thorough study of Brazil's economic growth during the entire twentieth century, see also ARMANDO
CASTELAR PINHEIRO ET AL., BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH,

1900-2000: LESSONS AND POLICY

IMPLICATIONS 4 (2004), available at http://idbdocs-iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=571

242.
20. Eduardo Loria, Ctr. of Modeling and Econ. Forecasting, Presentation at the Conference on
Finance and Development in Mexico: Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth in Mexico (June
1-2, 2007), slides available at http://usmex.ucsd.edu/programs/documentsE.Loria.pdf. For a study
using a different methodology but arriving at similar results, see also Rodrigo Garcia-Verd6, Demographics, Human Capital and Economic Growth in Mexico: 1950-2005, at 6-8 (June 12, 2007) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.cepal.org.ar/de/noticias/noticias/5/29015/RodrigoGarcia

_Verdu.pdf.
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tended to be more volatile than those
of advanced countries and develop21
ing countries outside the region.

In short, it is not a pretty picture. Economic growth and development
in Latin America has had a checkered past and generally lagged behind
other developing regions. Although at present many Latin American countries are seeing healthy growth rates, with populist left-leaning regimes
gaining power in various countries throughout the region there cannot be a
22
great deal of optimism that the future will be much different than the past.
Moreover, this less-than-encouraging economic history has occurred
in a region blessed with natural resources in the form of oil, natural gas,
timber, coal, copper, tin, bauxite, hydroelectric energy, and fertile agricultural lands. 23 Likewise, although plagued by repeated rounds of coups and
social upheaval, it is fair to say that Latin America is firmly rooted in the
Western Judeo-Christian tradition and has not suffered religious strife or
extremism-it has a rich cultural heritage stretching back hundreds of years
to Spain and Portugal, and, to a lesser extent, England and France. 24 Many
of the region's universities are rooted in European traditions dating back to
the early nineteenth century 25 and Latin Americans are proud of their artis-

21. Anoop Singh, Director, Western Hemisphere Dep't of the Int'l Monetary Fund, Address at
Catholic University, La Paz, Bolivia: Latin America: Building on Recent Trends and Sustaining Rising
Prosperity (May 10, 2007) (citations omitted), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2007/051007b.htm. See generally Andrrs Solimano, Regional Advisor, CEPAL, Presentation at the
Redima CAN Reunion in Lima, Peru: Economic Growth and Macro Management in Latin America:
Past, Present and Future Perspectives (June 21, 2005), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/
economia/redima2_cepall.pdf; Development Gateway Foundation, Country Resources-Knowledge,
Collaboration, Information, Partnerships, http://www.developmentgateway.org/cg/country-gateways/
dataandstatistics.do (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (listing information on indications of world development).
22. See Juan Forero & Larry Rohter, Bolivia's Leader Solidifies Region's Leftward Tilt, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at § 1, 1; Juan Forero, Latin America Looks Leftward Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2005, at § 4, 4; Juan Forero, Populist Movements Wrest Much of Latin America From Old Parties,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at A8.
23. Although economists generally agree that the region enjoys an abundance of natural resources,
some question whether this, in fact, hinders economic development in that it leads to income inequality,
an excessive reliance on exports of primary products at the expense of manufactured goods, a vulnerability to volatility (for example in commodities prices), and a lack of focus on job creation. Francisco
Rodriguez & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Why Do Resource-Abundant Economies Grow More Slowly? 4 J. ECON.
GROWTH 277, 277-78 (1999); Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann, Nature. Development and Distribution in Latin America: Evidence on the Role of Geography, Climate and Natural Resources 1-5
(Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 378, 1998), available at http://www.iadb.org/IDBDocs
.cfm?docnum=788197. But see DAVID DE FERRANTI, ET AL., FROM NATURAL RESOURCES TO THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: TRADE AND JOB QUALITY 5-6 (2002).
24. For a wide-ranging work on the many and conflicting roots of contemporary Latin American
political traditions, see HOWARD J. WIARDA, THE SOUL OF LATIN AMERICA: THE CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL TRADITION, at viii-ix, 9-10 (2001).
25. For a brief overview of university education in Latin America, including an historical summary and suggested policy reform, see Simon Schwartzman, Policies for Higher Education in Latin
America: The Context, 25 HIGHER EDUC. 9, 9-12, 14-16 (1993).
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tic and literary traditions, having produced many great artists, writers, and
thinkers. 26 Finally, most of its wars of independence were fought and won
nearly 200 years ago in the early nineteenth century. 27 Hence, one cannot
easily attribute Latin America's economic woes to post-independence
growing pains as one might do, perhaps, with various African countries. 28
Granted, as mentioned above, Latin America has had more than its
share of extreme leftist and rightist political movements, which are often
characterized by extraordinary violence and exploitation. But can poor
economic performance be attributed to these movements, or are they better
characterized as a mere contributing factor, operative only sporadically and
regionally? Also, parts of the region are plagued by a burgeoning drug
trade and the crime, warfare, economic distortion, and social dislocation
that often accompany local economies built upon drugs. 29 But again, the
drug trade is limited to certain pockets in certain countries 30 and can thus
scarcely account for economic patterns that persist throughout the entire
region.
What, then, are the roots and reasons of the dismal economic performance one finds throughout Latin America? And what can be done to remedy or at least improve its economic development?
These and some related questions were among the subjects being pondered at a gathering of academics, practitioners, and policymakers held
over two days in April of 2007 at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. The
participants included: academics and policymakers from Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela; American academics with an interest in, or expertise
26. The scholarly literature is too vast to list, but one only need think of such writers as Jorge Luis
Borges, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez, Octavio Paz, Isabel Allende, Carlos Fuentes, and
Mario Vargas Llosa, as well as artists like Diego Rivera, Frida Kahlo, Femando Botero, David Alfaro
Siqueiros, and Jos6 Clemente Orozco (with apologies to those omitted from this random list).
27.

ROBERT HARVEY, LIBERATORS: LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

1810-

1830, at 1-2 (2000); JOHN C. CHASTEEN, AMERICANOS: LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE (forthcoming 2007).
28. See Robert H. Bates, John H. Coatsworth & Jeffrey G. Williamson, Lost Decades: Lessons
from Post-IndependenceLatin Americafor Today's Africa 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 12610, 2006), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w12610.pdf (comparing the economic
performance of Latin America and Africa in the decades following their independence); Leandro Prados
de la Escosura, Colonial Independence and Economic Backwardness in Latin America 3, 33-38 (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 10/05, 2005), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ collections/economicHistory/GEHN/GEHNPDF/WorkingPaper1 OLPE.pdf.
29. MARK S. STEINITZ, THE TERRORISM AND DRUG CONNECTION IN LATIN AMERICA'S ANDEAN
REGION 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.revistainterforum.com/english/pdf en/pp-steinitz.pdf;
Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Introduction to LATIN AMERICA AND THE MULTINATIONAL DRUG TRADE 3-12
(Elizabeth Joyce & Carlos Malamud eds., 1998).
30. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007 World Drug Report 201-08, 217-20 (2007),
available at http:www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world-drug-report.html (indicating that the only producers
in Latin America are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru).
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on, Latin America; a former American ambassador to Mexico; an official
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD); and officials from the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank.
First, a disclaimer is in order. By its very nature, a symposium is limited in terms of its range of topics, length of contributions, and number of
participants. Also, a symposium necessarily must identify some focal point
for the participants to "rally 'round," so to speak. In this instance, it was
law and economic development. As a consequence, a harsh critic might
claim that the Symposium failed to consider such critical issues and possible causes for Latin America's economic malaise as religion and the role of
the Roman Catholic Church; 3 1 history and, in particular, the region's colonial history and the legacies of Spain and Portugal; 32 social, anthropological, and political dynamics; 33 corruption, exploitation, and poor
governance; 34 and the role of the military. 35 The list could be continued.
The participants in this Symposium, consistent with its theme, focused
on law and legal reform, transplants of laws from other legal systems, the
rule of law, corporate social responsibility, sovereign debt and its legal
implications, the nature of contracts, ethnic fragmentation, and free trade
and competition laws and policies. During the two days of the presentations-and over lunch, dinner, and a glass or two of wine-there was also a
great deal of mutual critique, cross-fertilization, and the sometimes surprising discovery of common ground. Professors Gelpern and Spector, from
Newark, New Jersey and Buenos Aires, Argentina, respectively, found they
covered some common ground in their analysis of Argentina's sovereign
debt crisis of 2001, albeit from very different perspectives. Dr. De Le6n
found himself, perhaps not surprisingly, in intense and challenging discussions with Dr. Alvarez; he approaching competition law with an unorthodox analysis that challenges the very foundations of traditional competition
theory, she from an empirical UNCTAD perspective that looks at competi31. For a thorough treatment of the role of the Catholic Church in Latin America, including its
impact on social and economic issues, see ANTHONY GILL, RENDERING UNTO CAESAR: THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (1998).

32. See generally Prados de la Escosura, supra note 28, at 1-2, 29.
33. For a thoughtful study of the impact of Latin American politics on economic development in
the region, see FRANCISCO RODRiGUEZ, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC

GROWTH (2001), available at http://www.gdnet.org/middle.php?oid=620 (scroll down to "Political
Economy of Growth" section and select "The Political Economy of Latin American Economic
Growth").

34. See the compilation of essays in COMBATING CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA (Joseph S.
Tulchin & Ralph H. Espach eds., 2000).
35. See
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tion law "on the ground" and aims to provide concrete technical assistance
to struggling government regulators. Ambassador Jones and Director General Motta, speaking from the experience they gained from their respective
roles in Mexico, traded views on Mexican industrial policy and the concept
of the rule of law. Again, the list could go on.
What, then, were some of the specific insights, prescriptions, and
ideas developed during the Symposium? In the pages that follow, I endeavor to offer brief summaries, synopses, and digests of the participants'
contributions, but, I hasten to add, they are my own summaries, synopses,
and digests and are only meant to stimulate and incite the scholar, the student-or even the dilettante-to read the authors' actual words. No Introduction and no summary can serve as a substitute for them.
Keeping those disclaimers and caveats in mind, surely one of the highlights of the proceedings was Mr. Vives's impassioned plea for a new strain
of corporate social responsibility, one grounded in rationality and what one
might call "enlightened self-interest. ' 36 Mr. Vives begins with the premise
that the prevailing methods of business valuation-namely stock market
trading prices and standard accounting practices-are misguided in their
focus on short-term performance at the expense of a longer-term profit and
value time horizon. He then goes on to argue that if company managers
follow a longer-term valuation model, it becomes not only easier but actually imperative for managers to incorporate strains of corporate social responsibility into their business strategies and planning. And what is a
rational and defensible definition of such corporate responsibility? Mr.
Vives makes the case that companies should clearly take responsibility for
the social consequences of their actions (for example, environmental consequences); beyond that seemingly obvious proposition, companies have a
moral imperative to go further than the law requires of them and, via selfregulation and with a view to their long-term profit and value calculus, they
must take social responsibility in areas related to their business activities.
In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Vives develops a number of corollary arguments, such as expanding the definition of the "stakeholders" of the firm
to include workers, customers, and communities. He also posits the "firm"
as an autonomous "actor" in society as opposed to a mere conglomeration
of contractual relations. Moreover, he draws a distinction between "hard
law" and "soft law," arguing that-at least in the area of corporate social
responsibility and at least in developing countries as in Latin Americasoft law, such as self-regulation, is often more effective in fashioning opti36. Antonio Vives, CorporateSocial Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets and the Case
of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199 (2008).
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mal conduct insofar as it is more efficient and more accepted than the "topdown" approach of governmental regulators imposing norms by fiat, which
are inevitably resisted by the regulated. Finally, he suggests that there is a
"market" for corporate social responsibility, in which, again particularly in
Latin America, a number of dynamics and actors ("drivers") come into play
to fashion an environment in which corporate social responsibility becomes
both a norm and a value.
Professor Okediji, an economist, began with the premise that ethnic
fragmentation, i.e., the division of a society's people into a number of distinct and not necessarily harmonious ethnicities, is generally considered
one of the key contributors to a lag in economic performance and development. Hence, measuring ethnic fragmentation is a useful tool in analyzing
economic development. Professor Okediji, however, argues that the traditional ethnic fragmentation measurement tool, the so-called EthnoLinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index, is a poor measure in that it relies
too heavily on different languages as a driver of fragmentation. Instead,
Professor Okediji proposes a new index, his "Social Diversity Index"
(SDI), to measure ethnic and social fragmentation. 37 Relying on data from
Brazil, Professor Okediji demonstrates that there, language is relatively
uniform in that Portuguese is used by virtually every ethnic group and social strata of society. Hence, Brazil registers relatively low on the ELF
Index, a result that is inconsistent with both the enormous wealth gap between rich and poor in Brazil and the utter lack of educational and career
opportunities for certain strata of society. Shifting to the SDI yields an
ethnic fragmentation measure more consistent with the economic performance and development of Brazil and provides the tools and data to develop
more effective rectification measures and remedies, such as laws and policies targeted at correcting specific identified instances of social and ethnic
fragmentation.
Competition law and policy in Latin America, as well as its impact on
economic development, was a central theme treated by several participants.
The orthodox premise underlying much of the literature on competition law
in Latin America-and feeding directly into the making of policy both
within the region and by outside actors like development agencies and institutions-is that free (or freer) competition will inevitably foster economic development: it lowers prices, hence benefiting consumers; it forces
domestic industry to become more efficient and productive, hence spurring
growth at home and making domestic industry more competitive abroad,
37. Tade 0. Okediji, The Color of Brazil: Law. Ethnic Fragmentation, and Economic Growth, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 185 (2008).
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thus boosting domestic employment; it creates a better and more inviting
playing field for foreign companies, hence increasing foreign investment;
and it renders markets more transparent, hence inhibiting corruption, crony38
ism, and corporatism.
And yet, does the evidence bear out the orthodox, widely accepted,
and seemingly obvious premise? As is so often the case, it depends.
Professor Sokol has conducted an exhaustive survey of the competition chapters (or lack thereof) in bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
concluded by Latin American countries. His contribution to the Symposium reports on the analytic results of his survey. 39 He reaches several conclusions. First, more often than not, countries treat competition chapters in
FTAs very different from all other chapters and clauses. Unlike the clauses
on tariffs and non-tariff barriers, competition chapters are rarely binding on
the signatories and rarely include a dispute settlement mechanism. This
striking fact has a number of consequences. For example, it leads to greater
informal cooperation among different countries' competition regulatory
and enforcement agencies, instead of the "top-down" (there is that term
again) regulation that binding agreements would bring about. This, in turn,
leads to a soft law approach to competition issues, as opposed to the hard
law that would be mandated by binding commitments. Soft law, in turn,
faces less institutional, political, and vested interest resistance, and instead
facilitates the emergence of norms and practices built on a "close to the
ground" reality. Finally, competition chapters included in FTAs have symbolic value and create expectations that, in turn, foster entry by foreign
firms and foreign investment and encourage small scale domestic entrants
into any given economic sector.
Still, is this arguably tentative approach to competition laws, via nonbinding inclusion in bilateral FTAs, more effective than the alternative of a
hard law binding solution? Professor Sokol cautiously suggests a need for
additional scholarship to flesh out the question of whether the resources
spent on developing and negotiating these tentative soft law agreements
outweigh the benefits and, if so, whether these resources might not instead
be devoted to improving existing agency capacities. It is a question worth
remembering-and pondering-in considering some of the other participants' contributions on competition law.

38. See Ignacio De Le6n. Latin American Competition Policy: From Nirvana Antitrust Policy to
Reality-Based Institutional Competition Building, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 39, 39-42 & nn. 1-9 (2008);
Sokol, supra note 1, at 238 nn.21-57 and accompanying text.
39. Sokol, supra note 1.
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Ana Maria Alvarez and Pierre Horna are officers at UNCTAD in Geneva and devote themselves to providing technical assistance to Latin
American countries in implementing or strengthening effective competition
law and policy. Writing from their perspective of having worked side by
side with national policymakers, legislators, and regulators, the authors
begin with a survey of some of the particular challenges Latin America
faces in the competition law arena: an already overstretched institutional
and regulatory infrastructure; an often weak and unpredictable legal system
and rule of law; the interface, coexistence, and tension between two inherited legal systems, namely, civil law and common law; a tendency to incorporate non-efficiency goals into competition law policy, such as consumer
welfare and social redress and betterment; a set of socio-economic issues
ranging from small markets, high barriers to entry, the legacy of stateowned enterprises and rushed privatization; and, last but by no means least,
the absence of a competition culture. These and other dynamics create special challenges that any effort to introduce competition law in Latin America must address. Dr. Alvarez and Mr. Horna, armed with the empirical
experience of having actually worked together with Latin American lawyers and economists on implementation, offer a cogent and insightful
analysis of these challenges in an effort to develop a prescriptive agenda
(or at least ideas). 40 This is the Competencia America Latina (COMPAL)
Programme, aimed at making competition law and policy part of the national agenda by offering technical assistance and co-management; developing corrective measures and policies; sponsoring opportunities for
consultation, dialogue, and cooperation; publicizing and disseminating
competition initiatives; and providing tools for institution building and
accountability. Dr. Alvarez and Mr. Horna further stress the importance of
bilateral and regional agreements, cross-agency initiatives, and channels of
cooperation and information-sharing. In particular, given the small size of
many Latin American markets and the regional (or even wider) reach of the
modem multinational enterprise, regional cooperation between and among
competition regulators is crucial, which has the added benefit of mutual
learning and sharing of experiences. The authors conclude with a brief
foray into the dynamics between trade and competition, stressing the need
to incorporate competition principles into trade negotiations in such sectors
as telecommunications, transportation, and financial services. Finally, returning to the primary mission of UNCTAD-and the topic of this Symposium-they make a specific recommendation to approach competition law
40. Ana Maria Alvarez & Pierre Horna, Implementing Competition Law and Policy in Latin
America: The Role of Technical Assistance, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91 (2008).
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and policy with a pro-development agenda by removing barriers to entry
for small entrepreneurs, enhancing consumer welfare by lowering prices
and improving quality, and creating an attractive environment for foreign
direct investment.
R. Shyam Khemani and Ana Isabel Carrasco work with the World
Bank's Financial and Private Sector Development Department. Their article argues that strengthening the development and implementation of competition law and policy in Latin America offers significant benefits in terms
of economic efficiency, consumer welfare via lower prices, business competitiveness, and, in general, broad-based economic growth. 4 1 To support
this thesis, Dr. Khemani and Ms. Carrasco have analyzed a number of economic surveys and studies that demonstrate the close links between an
effective domestic competition policy on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the ease of doing business, per capita GDP, (low) market dominance,
and business competitiveness. Perhaps more significantly, Dr. Khemani
and Ms. Carrasco further demonstrate the crucial significance of placing an
effective competition policy within a broader context of economic and
legal initiatives, i.e., by combining and coordinating competition policy
with other specific efforts such as reducing regulatory burdens, improving
the physical and business infrastructure for conducting business, liberalizing trade, combating corruption and rent-seeking, and reducing the market
concentration and dominance of the handful of elite corporate and business
groups that are so prevalent in many Latin American countries.
Dr. De Le6n offers us a contrarian challenge. 42 He argues that orthodox competition law and policy suffers from (at least) two fundamental and
related flaws. First, it is utterly devoid of any reliable and accurate tools for
measuring its consequences and effectiveness and is thus compelled to
invoke a utopian-or "nirvana"-concept of optimal social welfare, that is,
of perfect justice and perfect competition never achieved or measurable in
real terms. Second, the intellectual premise underlying traditional antitrust
theory is fundamentally flawed and internally contradictory. These fundamental flaws, in turn, lead to misguided market analysis and misconceived
policy formulation.
Dr. De Le6n begins with a survey of the consequences of recent economic liberalization in Latin America. Focusing on antitrust reform, he
points out that the goals of institutional reform designed to promote entrepreneurial activity, innovation, and economic growth conflict with an anti41. R. Shyam Khemani & Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment Cimate, Competition Policy, and
Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (2008).
42. De Le6n, supra note 38.
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trust policy aimed at a particular form of resource allocation, such as, for
example, an allocation consistent with Pareto efficiency. Dr. De Le6n goes
on to critique such traditional antitrust modes of analysis as determining the
"right" size of a market, positing "natural" monopolies, and aiming at "perfect" competition. He concludes this part of his paper by rejecting the normal concomitants of this type of antitrust thinking, concepts like "market
concentration," "cartels," mergers and acquisitions control, and "market
power" or "dominance." Using mathematical models, Dr. De Le6n demonstrates that the dual polar ends of perfect competition versus the perfect
monopoly represent a false dichotomy and are based on mutually inconsistent underlying assumptions, including the assumption that perfect competition depends on perfect information being available to all actors in the
market. Such a market of perfect competition, Dr. De Le6n further argues,
would actually lead to collective losses that can only be avoided through
collective coordination. This internal inconsistency of traditional antitrust
thinking then leads to flawed, indeed twisted, policymaking.
Dr. De Le6n makes the case that competition actually depends on imperfection-specifically imperfect information, i.e., a market in which different actors have access to different information. The information that is
or becomes known is further modulated through prejudices, beliefs, and
other filters through which individuals process, assimilate, and internalize
knowledge. Moreover, this selective and differentiated ability to access,
process, and utilize information, i.e., the "uneven" use of information
among market actors, is the very pre-condition that enables the system to
function at all.
If one adopts this assumption, diametrically opposed to the nirvana
model of perfect competition and perfect information, then the task of the
competition policymaker is very different from the orthodox analysis of
market concentration and cartel formation. Instead, competition policy
must embrace an alternative agenda, one that counteracts restrictions that
constrain market growth, mandate any fixed course of market action, exclude new entrants, impede free trade, undermine freedom of private contracting, or grant legal monopoly concessions. In Latin America, Dr. De
Le6n concludes, the competition agenda is still mired i: the contrived and
cumbersome nirvana model, while it remains singularly weak in consistently implementing the elements of the alternative model.
Director General Motta represents a return to the trenches of the actual, day-to-day, concrete reform and implementation of competition pol-
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icy, industrial policy, and trade policy. 43 As the Director General of Mexico's Comisi6n Federal de Competencia, he is charged with the daunting
task of fostering free competition across all of Mexico's economic sectors
(hence, he calls himself a "horizontal" regulator) amidst the extraordinary
forces of entrenched interest groups, political infighting, institutional turf
protection, and severe capacity and resources limitations.
Director General Motta provides a short historical overview of the
evolution of industrial and competition policy in Mexico. Prior to the
1980s, Mexico essentially followed a policy of import substitution, erecting
trade barriers such as ad valorem tariffs, fixed import prices, import licenses, and import controls. Domestic industry was largely protected. The
economy grew, but at the cost of industrial inefficiency, poor product quality, high prices, and limited product choices. The consumer suffered. In the
mid- to late- 1980s, and especially after Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, efforts were commenced to
liberalize trade and promote free competition. The results have been impressive: macro-economic stabilization, a more streamlined regulatory
system, and broad horizontal standardization across many sectors of the
economy. Still, some sectors remained largely immune to reform and liberalization, specifically energy, finance, transportation, and telecommunications. Director General Motta laments these carve-outs, not only in terms of
the overall thrust of any competition and liberalization policy, but also
because these sectors represent services that are used by all other industries
and, therefore, have a powerful ripple effect on the economy far beyond the
narrow confines of their individual sector markets.
Director General Motta, seasoned in the arts of the regulator, further
offers a brief survey of the political pressures he faces on a daily basis:
Congress and powerful politicians; consumer advocacy groups; a cumbersome and inefficient (if not worse) judiciary; and the interests, such as turf
protection, of other horizontal regulators, not to mention the natural resistance of vertical regulators (that is, those responsible for a specific economic or industrial sector) to encroachments from "outside." A related and
pervasive problem is the relative absence or paucity of accountability and
surveillance mechanisms, particularly in view of the persistent problem of
"regulatory capture." 44 The key problems identified by Director General
Motta at once suggest some remedial measures: greater coordination

43. Eduardo P6rez Motta, Industrial and Competition Policies in Mexico, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
31(2008).
44. The term "regulatory capture" refers to the problem of governmental regulators coming under
excessive and undue influence by industry and other interest groups. See id. at 33-35.
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among horizontal regulators; better accountability to key institutions such
as Congress, consumer groups, and the judiciary; and building a better legal
and institutional framework.
If Director General Motta offers a weary but nonetheless cautiouslyoptimistic perspective from the regulatory trenches, James Jones, Ambassador to Mexico from 1994 to 1998, makes a weighty argument from the
perspective of the seasoned American diplomat who was present during
Mexico's dramatic "Peso crisis" in 1994. 45 He poses the perhaps-rhetorical
question of whether opening the economic system inevitably leads to an
opening of the political system. Ambassador Jones concludes that it is more
effective to open the economic system first, as this creates popular demand
for opening the political system. Mexico, in the end, achieved both. Based
on his experience, Ambassador Jones argues that a "third leg" is needed for
economic development, namely, an effective rule of law in addition to open
economic and political systems. He further offers an unabashedly American critique of the civil law system, which he suggests is burdened by an
absence of transparency. This, combined with an inefficient and overbearing government bureaucratic apparatus, powerful vested interests, and endemic corruption, impedes economic development.
What is the meaning of the term "rule of law" and how can a country
improve its rule of law? One working definition is a sound judicial system
that facilitates every member of society becoming a stakeholder in a common enterprise aimed at collective betterment, bridges the gulf between
rich and poor, and provides a means for redress to all strata of society. In
terms of some of the measures that can help bring about an improved rule
of law, Ambassador Jones identifies four key drivers: (1) a reduction of the
perceived risks attendant on seeking judicial redress, (2) a more efficient
administration of justice, (3) a simplified regulatory structure, and (4)
greater transparency and independence of judicial institutions.
Ambassador Jones concludes with an admonition to the United States:
it must become more of a partner, and less of a paternalistic and patronizing superpower with an image of arrogance.
Professors del Granado and Mirow propose nothing short of a sweeping change in the Latin American legal order. 46 Working with and through
the Asociaci6n Latino-Americana y del Caribe de Derecho y Economia
(ALACDE), they issue a call to all Latin American legal scholars and law45. James R. Jones, Open Markets, Competitive Democracy, and Transparent and Reliable Legal
Systems: The Three Legs of Development, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 25 (2008).
46. Juan Javier del Granado & M.C. Mirow, The Future of the Economic Analysis of Law in Latin
America: A Proposalfor Model Codes, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (2008).
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yers to collectively develop a new model code of private law informed,
suffused, and shaped by two powerful strains of legal thought: (1) Roman
private law, and (2) the principles of law and economics as developed
largely in American legal academic circles in the past few decades. Professors del Granado and Mirow argue that a code of private law built on the
foundation of Roman private law and incorporating law and economics in a
principled way would contribute powerfully to economic development in
Latin America.
Their ambitious program would take years to develop, let alone implement. It would face a myriad of obstacles, ranging across the spectrum
from political, social, cultural, economic, and institutional resistance to
skeptical academics that wish to undermine the entire project, as well as to
the inevitable problems that attend transforming academic ideas into concrete laws. The authors are not naive. They understand these issues and
suggest, in a nod to the limitations of an academic enterprise of this nature,
that once their model code is "up and running," so to speak, it will be available for legislators and policymakers (and skeptical academics) to selectively analyze, modify, and adapt it to suit the particular needs and
circumstances of each country. Realistic or "pie in the sky," one cannot
help but admire the sheer scale of the model code project and, by extension,
the (perhaps Don Quixotian) heroism of its originators.
Professor Claire Hill talks about the rule of law in a very different
context. 4 7 In the past, she has analyzed the difference between contracts in
civil law and common law countries; she notes that even in advanced legal
systems, like that of Germany, American-style contracts, with their endless
boilerplate, detailed provisions for every conceivable contingency, and
seemingly paranoid protectiveness of the drafting party, are increasingly
making inroads in Germany, at least when German companies conduct
business with American companies. 48 A similar pattern can be observed in
Latin America, where long American-style contracts are increasingly
dominating the landscape, displacing traditionally short and to-the-point
agreements with their heavy reliance on the logic and refinement of the
Civil Code structure.
Why should this be the case? The reasons cited by Professor Hill include such drivers as the superior bargaining power of large American
companies and the (arguably) superior experience of their lawyers in com47. Claire A. Hill, Commentary, The Trajectory of Complex Business Contracting in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 179 (2008).

48. Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do As Much With Fewer
Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 889 (2004).

2008]

INTRODUCTION

plex international business transactions; the inherent power and persuasiveness of contracts with more verbiage; the dominance of the American
model of rules of law and contract construction, combined with the perceived need for American companies to use longer contracts for purposes
of potential litigation in an American court; and, lastly, a possible "arms
race" that tends to produce ever-longer contracts, which are perceived to
create ever-stronger legal protections. She also mentions the growing
Americanization of law firms as institutions, with the normative influence
of their way of practicing law.
Professor Hill then examines some of the implications of this trend
towards longer and longer contracts. First, they imply a relative lack or
absence of trust. The breadth and sweep of the parties' negotiations, together with the scope of contract coverage, combine to a large extent to
obviate the need for mutual trust or reliance on good faith. At least the
latter is a cornerstone of civil law jurisprudence in the private sphere (although by no means unimportant in common law). Moreover, the reliance
on long contracts replaces a relative lack of transparency, homogeneity,
and a reliable system of judicial administration. It also brings about a gradual convergence of legal practice and norms, at least in the contractual and
commercial areas and in an age of increasing globalization. Professor Hill
poses-but leaves us to ponder-the question of whether these developments also spawn greater efficiency and, by extension, economic development.
Professor Gelpern's topic is sovereign debt, credit derivatives, and the
transformation of sovereign debt. 49 She begins with a brief historical survey of the markets in emerging market sovereign debt. In the past, it was
nearly impossible for the governments of emerging countries to market
sovereign debt in their domestic currency in the so-called "mature" markets, i.e., the major international capital markets in, for example, London
and New York. Instead, for the most part, they were relegated to either
issuing hard currency debt or offering domestic bonds to domestic investors. This is a pattern Professor Gelpern calls "compartmentalization," a
division of debt markets into local and foreign, characterized by an absence
of risk transfer.
This pattern gradually evolved into the emergence of a true emerging
debt market, in which foreign investors also purchased domestic currency
debt, but at the price of interest rates that could approach "junk bond" rates.
Today, with the new financial respectability that many emerging countries
49. Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, CreditDerivatives, and the Next Transformation of Sovereign
Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (2008).
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enjoy, sovereign debt markets have evolved to a point of near, but not yet
complete, convergence. In other words, the mature sovereign debt market
for developed country debt is now also relatively accessible to emerging
market debt as the latter has become nearly "mainstream."
These developments are good for those countries' economic development. They deepen their access to capital, afford them greater flexibility on
structuring and placing debt, and deepen local capital markets. They also
effect a shift from an emerging market transactional debt market to one
characterized by mature institutional commitments. Professor Gelpern analyzes the four key drivers of such a market, namely: (1) governing law, in
which one observes a trend away from the local law that often facilitated
local restructurings by fiat; (2) currency, where one observes the growing
trust of investors in a developing country's ability to manage its currency
soundly; (3) creditor identity, where one observes an increasing trend away
from a fixed set of known creditors to a more differentiated structure
marked by layers of intermediaries, offshore markets and obscure residencies, and increasing liquidity, i.e., transfers of debt; and, perhaps most importantly, (4) risk transfer techniques. The latter is reflected in the
profusion of complicated credit derivatives instruments, which have become increasingly sophisticated and permit the ever more finely tuned
transfer and hedging of highly differentiated slivers of risk.
Examining some recent American case law on sovereign debt, Professor Gelpern concludes with an admonition to courts to eschew a policyoriented and norm-based crisis resolution approach in favor of a more focused and narrow judicial interpretation of parties' express contract terms,
albeit with caveat that with the ever-greater complexity of risk transfer and
slicing techniques, those contract terms can become mired in technical
jargon and derivatives lingo. Still, with the aid of scholars and experts,
judges should be more than able to master derivatives issues. And, with the
increasing global financial integration of emerging markets into the mainstream, and the emergence of a new "international financial architecture,"
opportunities abound for economists and legal scholars to contribute to
financial innovation and the further solidification of emerging markets into,
if not exactly "safe havens," fully integrated actors in the mainstream. That,
of course, will be a powerful driver of their economic development.
Professor Spector's very thoughtful and thought-provoking piece deals
with the mutation effect when laws are transplanted from one legal system
to another.5 0 He begins with an examination of Argentina's adoption of

50. Spector, supra note 9.
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significant portions of the American Constitution. But, when laws are
transplanted the adopting country tends to also adopt some of the origin
country's precedents interpreting the adopted text. This, in turn, can lead to
a "mutation effect" with surprising results.
In Argentina, a civil law country with a relative lack of training in judicial interpretation and a tendency toward abstractness, the results can be
especially jarring. Civil lawyers, with their reliance on the structural, allencompassing nature of civil codes, often conduct legal analysis without
remaining solidly grounded in the facts of a case, whereas in common law
jurisprudence, every law student learns that the "holding" of any case is
uniquely fact-dependent. The result, Professor Spector argues, is that in
Argentina's borrowing of constitutional precedent, its Supreme Court goes
far beyond the facts of the borrowed precedent and applies it to justify a
heterodox interpretation of the Argentine Constitution.
A powerful example of such mutation has occurred in the context of
economic emergency, which has been used to justify the expropriation of
bank deposits. Argentina's Constitution from 1860 followed the American
model of incorporating a laissez-faire economic approach and safeguarding
property rights. Between 1880 and 1930, Argentine courts used American
constitutional precedent very successfully to support and sustain a period of
unprecedented economic growth. 5 1 Then, between 1920 and 1930, Argentina borrowed economic emergency analysis from the United States to suspend regular norms and permit the government's impairment of contracts,
specifically bank deposits and debt obligations. The Argentine Supreme
Court fashioned a four-part test as to when such impairment of contracts is
permissible, namely, that (1) an emergency must exist, (2) the impairment
measure must have as its purpose the safeguarding of public welfare, (3)
the measure must be reasonable, and (4) the measure must be temporary.
The latter concept-that the measure must be temporary-is particularly
significant because it implies that there must be only a temporary suspension of property rights, not a transformation or, worse, deprivation, of substantive rights.
The 1989 Argentine crisis led to the "mutation effect," insofar as the
Supreme Court allowed President Menem to convert time deposits into
bonds. Moreover, an additional effect was an alteration in the separation of
powers in that Menem was allowed to bring about a fundamental restructuring of the banking sector. In short, what occurred was a true mutation
and expansion of an American precedent that had been grounded in narrow

51.
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and exceptional facts with only limited legal consequences. This pattern
was replicated in 2001, when a succession of presidents over a very short
time period implemented a massive restructuring of all bank deposits,
52
amounting to a confiscation of assets.
From this pattern of the mutation of transplanted laws-laws that in
principle are sound and salutary-Professor Spector draws two sobering
lessons. First, the borrowing of common law principles will not necessarily
afford investors greater protection than civil law principles. Second, while
there was a high local (Argentine) demand for the borrowed principles,
they nevertheless proved ineffective, in that in the instances described they
failed to bring about a healthy and robust banking system.
What then are some of the larger lessons to be extracted from the
Symposium? Amazingly, given the diversity of participants and the divergence of their views, a few common themes clearly emerge. One is the
perhaps counterintuitive insight that soft law is often more effective than
hard law in achieving its objectives. Norms and rules that are black letter
law, often imposed from above or, worse, by external actors like the World
Bank or the IMF, are by their nature inflexible and often face institutional
resistance or a simple institutional lack of implementation capacity. They
are also often divorced from reality in that they fail to recognize or make
allowance for opposition by powerful entrenched interest groups (whether
political or business-driven), which in turn leads to a failure of enforcement
or implementation. And hard law, when not enforced, not only withers
away but actually undermines the rule of law.
Soft law, by comparison, is non-binding and bends to conditions on
the ground, i.e., the real needs of real regulators: needs such as expertise,
technical assistance, cooperation, and an exchange of ideas. Soft law, precisely because it is "soft" and merely points to norms rather than imposing
them, also invites less criticism and resistance from entrenched interest
groups. Soft law sends symbolic signals to stakeholders in the system, as
well as to foreign parties who may be swayed to invest directly. Finally,
soft law can evolve into hard law and hard norms, and the resulting laws
and norms have a much greater chance of actually being accepted and enforced. These messages are conveyed in the contributions of Messrs. Sokol,
Alvarez and Horna, and Vives.
An important but by no means obvious corollary of the superiority of
soft law over hard law is that effective economic development will require
52. As Professor Spector describes in detail, the judicial decisions are conflicting, but nevertheless
collectively stand for a broad expansion of the principle that an economic emergency justifies a fundamental restructuring of property rights. Id. at 136-44.
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working "close to the ground," that is, working as closely as possible with
those most directly affected by regulatory reform, trade liberalization, and
freer competition. By working directly and closely with those groups, the
political process of give and take will lead to the formulation of realistic
norms, will bring about more ready acceptance, and will give all participants a personal stake in success. This is the powerful message conveyed
by Director General Motta.
The contributions of academics-including those who participated in
this Symposium-should also be given their due. Far from toiling all but
forgotten in dusty libraries, they can sort out often obscure and entangled
new legal developments and illuminate new paths and fruitful openings.
Whether in the realm of actual contracts as actually negotiated (Hill), the
complex world of risk transfer and credit derivatives (Gelpern), the idealism of a new private legal order (del Granado and Mirow), the interpretation of legal transplants (Spector), or the illusory certitude of traditional
antitrust theory (De Le6n) and conventional social fragmentation indices
(Okediji), academics highlight past fallacies, debunk facile or reactionary
paranoia, and suggest new and more productive approaches and solutions.
If any reader of any article of this Symposium can take away even one
of those lessons-or, better yet, one not discovered or alluded to in these
introductory remarks-the Symposium will count as a success, even beyond the immediate benefit of spawning an intense debate and crossfertilization among the participants themselves.

